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1. Introduction   
During the last decades the international economic environment has significantly changed, 
especially in the European Union (EU). Transaction costs have decreased not least because of 
rapid innovation in information and communication technology as well as improvements in 
transnational supply chain management. New competitors struggle for market shares. The 
creation of new financial instruments on the one hand opens different forms of access to capital, 
but it also raises costs when financial actors demand higher returns. At the same time the 
international division of labour has increased as a consequence of systematically reducing 
barriers to international trade and investment.  
These developments were taken up and speeded up by policies of the EU and its member states. 
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financial markets, the introduction of a common currency for most of the EU citizens, and a 
further removal of barriers to the free trade of goods, services and labour within and through the 
single market. These processes were accompanied and executed by several modes and means of 
governance, ranging from hard to soft governance. With the Euro monetary policy is nowadays 
centralised in one hand, the quasi-autonomous European Central Bank (ECB), and is effective 
for all members of the European Monetary Union (EMU). It was accompanied by monitoring of 
the public budgets in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which as governance mode is much 
less strict than monetary policy. Although sanctions are possible in principle, only mild forms 
of binding policy coordination take place between European and national levels in the field of 
fiscal policy. All other fields of economic policy – employment, wage and general economic 
policies – are subject to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a formally non-binding kind 
of policy coordination. Through procedures between both levels, EU and national, all actors try 
to agree on best practices and effective policy measures. Except for the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue, guidelines for the member states result from these procedures, namely the 
Employment Guidelines (EG) and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), which were 
pooled in the Integrated Guidelines (IG) in 2005.  
Contrary to optimistic expectations, however, these policy measures and procedures have not 
led to economic prosperity. Although the EU offers a broad range of guidelines, best practices 
and implementation processes – since 2000 reshaped and concentrated in the Lisbon agenda and
its focus on competitiveness, growth, and to a lesser extent social cohesion –, the economic 
situation for the EU as a whole is still characterised by sluggish growth, stagnant employment 
and persistent unemployment. Furthermore, in the field of industrial relations the experience 
with the outcomes of the new soft and open forms of governance is mixed (Schäfer and Leiber 
this issue). While supranational economic coordination is indeed emerging in the fields of 
monetary and fiscal policy, we still observe a broad range of institutional settings at national 
level in other policy fields, and especially in industrial relations.. In some member states 
formerly consensual models of social partnership between management and employees are on 
the retreat and seem to be replaced by more conflictual forms of social exchange at both 
industry as well as company level. Concession bargaining between management and labour at 
the company level, undercutting collective wage and employment standards set in labour 
contracts at the industry or national level, are spreading in a number of EU member countries 
(Sisson and Artiles 2000).  
In this contribution, the interdependencies between EU economic policies and national 
industrial relations are addressed. This means that we must examine the scope and the impact of 
EU governance on the national level, in order to shed some light on both the impact of the EU 
on the national level and potential repercussions of national developments in industrial relations 
on EU coordination. EU guidelines or rules might alter the rules for national bargaining in two 
ways. Directly through changes in legislation or hard governance and more indirectly through 
the outcomes of economic policy, which may cause an increase or a decrease in economic 
growth and employment that in turn affects the social actors’ bargaining power at the national, 
sectoral as well as the firm level. Therefore, the question is addressed which policies – hard or 
soft, monetary, fiscal or wage policies – have changed the conditions for the national level and 
to what extent national factors played a role for developments in industrial relations.  
Due to the different cultures, social models and stages of development within the EU, especially 
after the EU Eastern enlargement, a comprehensive assessment of interdependencies would 
have to include all member states and sound evaluation of national developments. Here, another 
approach is chosen. By using the case of Germany to illustrate this relationship between EU and 
member states we do not argue that the example of Germany can be generalised for all member 
states or that Germany is per se an institutional or political role model that other countries have 
to adapt to. On the contrary, the German Rhineland model of a coordinated market economy 
seems to lose coherence. What is claimed is that Germany, being the largest economy of the 
EU, necessarily has an impact on the future evolution of the EU because of the size of its gross 
domestic product (GDP) and its relevance for intra-EU trade and wage differentials. Therefore, 
the case of Germany is of special interest and might also shed some light on future prospects of 
a coordinated and coherent EU economic policy. 
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the second section, I identify the modes of governance of the current EU economic policy, and 
in section 3 I analyse their influence on the national wage bargaining systems. For Germany, I 
investigate the substantive and institutional outcomes of the recent labour market policies and 
reforms (section 4). Then, potential consequences of these ongoing changes in national 
industrial relations for the European Union are discussed in section 5. The last section 
concludes.  
2. Maastricht and beyond: The economic policy framework of the EU   
After the single market, enacted in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty – ratified in 1993 – set the basic 
framework for European economic policy and the regulation of production and exchange 
(Dyson 1999). It deepened integration and prepared the EU for the monetary union of 1999, and 
the establishment of the ECB as an autonomous body, created by intergovernmental treaty in 
charge of price stability. Price stability is interpreted by the Central Bank as an inflation rate 
target nearby and below two per cent (European Central Bank 2003). The ECB can take, and 
also implement, the relevant decisions single-handedly, which is a direct or hard mode of 
governance.  
As an essential element to support monetary policy, fiscal discipline was seen necessary (Dyson 
1999). The national budget, however, is a principal competence of the parliaments; its 
limitation is always met with resistance. Therefore, national fiscal policies are not concentrated 
at the European level, but only coordinated through the SGP. The aim of the pact is to compel 
the EU countries to keep their national budgets balanced in the medium term, by a 3 per cent 
current deficit target, and to limit their level of indebtedness (to 60 per cent of their GDP). In 
case countries deviate from these targets, an excessive deficit procedure can be started, and 
eventually legally binding financial sanctions can take place, although sanctions have not been 
applied as of now, and there has been more room for discretion and for country-specific 
situations since 2003 (EcoFin Council 2005).  
Additionally, a framework of best practice procedures and common guidelines was established. 
Since 1993, the BEPG have comprised economic policy recommendations addressed to the 
member states. It was highly disputed to what extent these guidelines should be compulsory 
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Finally, a procedure was established that is based on a common 
agreement of guidelines and implementation without sanctions. Similar in procedure, the 
summit of Amsterdam triggered the creation of the EG to improve the quality and quantity of 
employment at the national labour markets (Goetschy 1999). As a result of the streamlining 
process of the newly arranged Lisbon Strategy (CEC 2005) both guidelines, the BEGP since 
2003 and the EG since 2005, are valid for a three year period; moreover, the focus has shifted to 
implementation, and they were united in one paper in 2005, the so called Integrated Guidelines 
(Integrated Guidelines 2005).  
Together with further procedures dealing with poverty and social cohesion these guidelines 
employ a type of governance coined ‘Open Method of Coordination’, officially introduced with 
the Lisbon Strategy, but having its forerunners in the EU since the 1970s and in coordination 
procedures of other international organisations (Schäfer 2006; Kröger this issue). Contrary to 
the community method and to autonomous supranational actors like the ECB, the OMC is a 
softer mode of governance, where policy decisions are the result of a mutual coordination 
process, and are laid down only in outline. Convergence is achieved by means of best practice 
and peer pressure. It is open with respect to output, and it includes a broader range of actors 
compared to the community method, including employer associations and trade unions in 
particular. Ideally, coordination creates policy learning and adoption of best practices (Hodson 
and Maher 2001). On the other hand, the choice of soft governance over hard forms indicates, 
as Schäfer (2004) argues, that the European Council, at that time dominated by social 
democratic governments, established the OMC essentially not to trigger policy learning but to 
maintain leeway for national programmes in the policy fields of the OMC.  
Partly, this mode of governance is also used in the Macroeconomic Dialogue, an outcome of the 
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Council of Ministers, the Commission, the ECB, trade unions and employers to coordinate 
fiscal, monetary, wage and labour market policies (Heise 2002; Niechoj 2005b). This dialogue, 
however, is purely a forum for information exchange, and it issues neither reports nor 
guidelines.  
The essential element of SGP and OMC is the preservation of the member state’s sovereignty 
concerning the structure of budgets and policy measures, not transferred to the EU level. This 
indicates that (neo-)functionalist arguments of an ongoing integration and supranationalisation 
of the EU have their limits. Hard governance or supranational institutions are not an option for 
labour markets, social security and state budgets by now. Here, the institutional and cultural 
differences, as well as the interest of the state in retaining its autonomy and authority are 
enormous (Moravcsik 1993); the potential gains, if there are any, cannot overcompensate for 
this. OMC, however, offers a way out. Aiming at policy learning and focusing on best practices, 
differences in interpretation can be overcome and, effective measures can be identified and 
hence implemented. This strategy of smoothing the differences preventing further policy 
integration through the backdoor of policy learning is contingent on the governments’
willingness to accept and implement recommendations of the OMC. If the OMC is not fully 
integrated in national discourses and decision processes the, existing conflicts of interest 
preventing a deepening of integration are hard to overcome. Moreover, OMC procedures do not 
act in a vacuum. They are accompanied by harder forms of governance that also shape policy 
concepts, measures and outcomes.  
Having sketched the modes of governance seminal for economic policy, now their substantive 
output, i.e. the economic policy concept emanating from these governance efforts is analysed. 
For this purpose, the IG can serve as a pars pro toto (Integrated Guidelines 2005; Niechoj 
2005a). They contain recommendations for all policy areas related to the economy, and they are 
consistent with the Lisbon Strategy and all other coordination processes. As considered 
necessary to regain economic strength and competitiveness, the IG propose structural reforms 
on the commodity and labour markets – privatisation, decentralisation and flexibilisation –
which seek to promote potential growth through intensified competition, increased division of 
labour, and reduced transaction costs. A so called ‘sound‘ macroeconomic framework should 
ensure a situation of stability and certainty for structural reforms and competition. This includes 
balanced national budgets to consolidate government finances in the medium term, a monetary 
policy focusing primarily on the stability of price levels, and a wage policy that keeps wage 
increases at moderate levels, i.e. equal or less the sum of productivity gains and inflation.  
The concept behind the guidelines has remained more or less unchanged since the beginning; 
the streamlining process as a reaction to the ongoing debate on the Lisbon Strategy of the 2000 
summit confirmed the validity of the guidelines by extending the period of the application of 
the guidelines and by focusing on implementation and not revision of the guidelines (CEC 
2005). Nevertheless, it can be disputed whether better implementation is indeed what is needed. 
Some authors doubt this and identify the policy concept itself as the reason of the poor 
performance of the EU. In their view, deregulation of labour markets accompanied by 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policy was the root of, rather than the solution to the economic 
recession, because it destabilised and lowered effective demand (Allsopp and Artis 2003; 
Arestis and Sawyer 2003).  
3. Hard and soft forms of governance: What it means for national industrial 
relations  
This section presents an overview of studies, in order to identify which part (or combination of 
parts) of the EU economic policy framework – soft or hard modes of governance, monetary, 
fiscal and wage policies – had an impact on the national level, or to be more precise: on national
industrial relations. The case study in the following section then deals with the substantive and 
institutional changes as they manifest themselves in Germany. Here, channels of influence from 
the European level to national-level industrial relations are sketched. 
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of a broader phenomenon, the internationalisation of trade and production, comprising 
innovations in information and communication technology as well as financial products and 
improvements in transnational supply chain management or the emergence of new competing 
economies outside the EU. Internationalisation was first and foremost a driver of slow but 
thorough restructuring of inter-firm competition. It created new cost, finance and sales 
conditions for companies within Europe, and globally. Nowadays, for companies it is possible 
to raise their global sourcing options, to use international production locations and to credibly 
threaten to relocate plants. This again puts pressure on wages and employment standards, as the 
social partners at company level try to increase corporate efficiency by lowering wages and 
extending working times (Traxler 2003; Grahl and Teague 2003). The EU did not cause all this, 
but it fostered the development by creating the single market and the monetary union, while at 
the same time trying to control and use this trend of internationalisation. The means were 
increased coordination of economic policy and common political initiatives, thus, the Lisbon 
Strategy, to become the most competitive economy in the world.  
This also holds for the financial system. Traditionally, in most of the Continental-European 
countries the financial markets were underdeveloped, or, to be more precise: they were largely 
unnecessary because of the bank-oriented financial system, where banks fostered long-term 
relationships with their clientele and supervised management decisions. With the liberalisation 
and expansion of financial markets in Europe, the conditions for investment financing changed 
enormously from the bank-oriented system in most of the EU-countries toward a market-
oriented system – even in Germany with its long tradition of bank-financed investments 
(Höpner 2001; Frangakis 2009). As a consequence, we can observe a shift from growth to 
profit-rate orientation in most countries, caused by the growing influence of shareholders, 
mostly large funds, with short-term interests and much looser integration in management 
(Stockhammer 2004).  
The same Janus-faced impression of economic integration appears with respect to the most 
recent Eastward enlargements, by which twelve new member states, which generally have low 
levels of coordination in their industrial relations systems and significantly lower wage levels, 
joined the EU (Weiss 2004; Dauderstädt 2003). Enlargement offers great advantages for the EU 
as a whole. It creates new markets, fosters catch-up in the new member states, and intensifies 
the international division of labour. Nevertheless, it will also lead to new cross-border supply 
and production chains, and it is frequently used by management to exert pressure on wages and 
working conditions by playing plants off against each other.  
Looking at wages in EMU, we observe a moderate development of wages after Maastricht and 
likewise a significantly reduced inflation rate. As a result of the monetary union, wages are 
directly comparable, and currency devaluations are no longer possible. As an effect of the low 
wage increases, no inflationary pressure emanated from wage increases (Hein 2002; Schulten 
2008). The EU supports this moderation of wages. The Lisbon Strategy and its procedures try to 
push ahead the flexibilisation of labour markets and moderate wage increases. The EU 
countries receive recommendations as to how they should improve training for the labour force 
and make the labour market more adaptable to economic change. The guidelines and 
recommendations are aimed primarily at structural changes in the labour market, seeking not 
only to boost training, but also to make labour more flexible and to strengthen the incentives to 
take up work (Goetschy 1999; Watt 2004). The current policies promote wage diffusion, 
flexibilisation of working times, decentralisation of wage bargaining and moderate wages (Hein 
and Schulten 2004; Hein and Niechoj 2007). They therefore follow a neo-classical approach to 
the labour market, whereby rigidities should be reduced as far as possible. Measures that 
promote social cohesion and protection are an issue in the guidelines and recommendations of 
the EU, when it comes to implementation, the member states prefer deregulation and market 
enforcing policies (Rubery et al. 2008).  
However, the impact of all these recommendations and procedures on national level is 
disputable. Although labour market reforms are often in line with the recommendations of the 
IG, a direct causal link of EU and national policies is hard to establish; national labour market 
policy normally refers not to the European recommendations (Linsenmann 2007). As the 
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Amsterdam summit has shown reasons might be that states were not interested in too strict 
guidelines; that apart from some ministerial units, national actors are involved in the 
establishment of recommendations only to a limited extent; and that participatory aspects and 
the inclusion of the national level, in theory an essential part of the OMC, lack practical 
implementation (Smismans 2006). Moreover, establishing a culture of common knowledge and 
mutual learning is a long-term project (Pfister this issue).  
Regardless of whether or not the employment strategy of the EU was reasonable, it can be 
shown that fiscal and monetary policies were not tied in with the employment strategy very 
well. It is precisely these policy fields, however, that the impact of the EU is more obvious.  
The creation of both the ECB and the SGP stem from the fear of governments, especially the 
German government, that after monetary union member states might tend to exert loose fiscal 
policies and push the central bank towards a loose monetary policy too (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999). In order to bind the states and prevent such policies, the status of the ECB 
was enshrined as an autonomous actor solely responsible for interest rate policy for all member 
states of the eurozone. Agreement was relatively easy to achieve, first because the Euro and the 
monetary union was a high-valued good for all countries; and secondly, to agree was a 
prerequisite for the whole exercise. The Germans, the country with the strongest currency, were 
both interested in a stable currency union and in a position to set rules ensuring this. Thus, 
monetary policy was accompanied by a set of rules for fiscal policies, still a responsibility of 
the member states (Stark 2001). Tentatively institutionalised in the Maastricht treaty and later 
extended at Amsterdam, deficit procedures for states deviating from balanced budgets were 
established in the form of a pact, the SGP. Since the pact cannot directly intervene in national 
budgets, but can compel the EMU member countries to adopt adjustment measures, and can 
enforce these by means of legally binding sanctions, this mode of governance is not as hard 
(and binding) as monetary policy but harder as the OMC. The pact has been put to the test 
several times so far by long lasting deficits above the 3 per cent criteria; countries were never 
sanctioned, however. This was both due to political and economic reasons. On the one hand it 
became clear that the shadow of sanctions was not enough to ensure balanced budgets, on the 
other hand more leeway for automatic stabilisers and the necessity to take into account country 
specific conditions were recognised as economically reasonable (Niechoj 2005a). For most of 
the EMU countries it holds that the discussion on the relaxation of the pact remained within the 
government and the ministries. Sometimes, as in Germany, factions within the government and 
the political parties referred to the EU pact as an external pressure to push for stricter fiscal 
rules within the country. As the example of Germany recently showed, this helped to introduce 
a so called debt brake, i.e. a fiscal corset to guarantee (nearly) balanced budgets in the medium 
term (Föderalismusreformkommission II 2009). But as the example of Switzerland, the first 
European country that introduced a debt brake, indicates, the SGP cannot solely be held 
responsible for stricter fiscal rules within the member states – Switzerland is not a member state 
of the EU.  
Concerning the outcomes of SGP and ECB policies, fiscal and monetary stimuli were 
insufficient or sometimes even counterproductive. Since the beginning of the convergence 
process to the monetary union in 1994, growth remained unsatisfactory or even declined 
between 1994 and 2003, and unemployment was still high. At the same time that inflation rates 
fell and converged, growth and employment were not positively affected (Hein and Niechoj 
2007).  
Since the start of EMU, the common inflation rate has been very close to the ECB target rate of 
2 per cent. Nevertheless, monetary policy has been more or less restrictive (Bibow 2002). The 
ECB keeps the inflation rate low but sometimes does so at the expense of high nominal and real 
interest rates. A constellation, however, in which the real interest rate is higher than the real 
growth rate, causes the danger of excessive debts for debtors because they are not able to pay 
the debts alone by their growth, which in turn limits investment by firms.  
As in the case of monetary policy, fiscal policy did not support growth in the EMU either 
(Bibow 2004). Quite often fiscal policy acted pro-cyclically, which means, it lowered 
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intensifies economic crisis and provokes overheating in an upswing. In addition, public 
investment – which serves as a basis for private investment and promotes future growth –
declined (Hein and Niechoj 2007).  
In contrast to the Lisbon targets, European economic policy could not succeed in raising the 
growth rate and correspondingly contributed nothing to reducing unemployment in the desired 
way. Especially Germany, which represents roughly 30 per cent of the EU 12 (1) GDP, has not 
performed very well (Hein et al. 2004). Both monetary policy and the SGP set strict limits for a 
growth and employment promoting national policy. Much softer limits were set by the 
recommendations of the OMC. Here, the member states have a lot more leeway to act.  
Against this background, three related reasons why sluggish growth and decentralisation alter 
power relations among the social actors can be identified.  
1. Competition has intensified on the national labour market, mostly independently of the 
EU, but also due to EU-influence or due to non-acting of the EU. Not least because of the 
employers’ associations’ resistance against supranational social rules and bargaining 
procedures, there is still no European system of industrial relations which could serve as 
a barrier against wage competition among states and regions (Hyman 2001). So the 
European level has not promoted procedures that would shelter national bargaining 
systems. In addition, it has created some pressures at the national level by establishing 
guidelines and recommendations favouring decentralisation, deregulation and 
privatisation.  
2. Without a European coordination system for wage policy, companies are able to use the 
threat of international plant relocation as a tactical tool to achieve cost cutting at the 
company level (Peters 2001). The availability and economic attractiveness of outside 
alternatives cause a shift in the relative distribution of bargaining power between 
management and labour in favour of the party that possesses the most attractive exit 
option (Emerson 1962; Bacharach and Lawler 1981).  
3. None of the policies have been able to counter sluggish growth and still high 
unemployment in the EU. In such a constellation of job shortage and a low rate of new 
investment, it is very difficult for trade unions to negotiate wage settlements which 
guarantee distribution-neutral wage increases (Hein et al. 2004). In the face of high
unemployment, employees and trade unions lack attractive exit options, which weakens 
their negotiation position. All they can do is focus on the prevention of dismissals. In 
order to reach this aim, they have to agree to moderate wage increases or even freezes or 
cutbacks and further concessions such as working time extension.  
Whether this potential pressure on industrial relations translates into institutional changes 
and/or distributive changes at the national level is exemplified by means of a case study in the 
next section.  
4. Collective bargaining decentralisation in Germany   
The interest in Germany can be traced back to its former role as a quasi ideal type of a 
‘coordinated market economy’ (Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001), i.e. an economy
characterised by a complementary set of institutions including stable and cooperative relations 
among companies, the state, banks and trade unions. In the past, Germany’s system of industrial 
relations proved to be resistant to procedural changes and shifts in power relations. Now 
elements of Anglo-Saxon-type regulation enter the German institutional setting. If the German 
institutional system is undergoing severe changes, this could point to a situation in flux for 
other EU member states of a corporatist-coordinated type; they might be undergoing similar 
changes. A prerequisite for this would either be that EU policies have an impact on the German 
situation or that – independently of the influence of the EU – the restructured German industrial 
relations system affects other EU member states. In order to clarify to what extent EU 
macroeconomic policies and coordination procedures contributed to changes at the national 
level, and to what extent national labour market reforms were inspired by the EU or national 
© 2009 by Torsten Niechoj
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-010a.htm 7factors, the development of industrial relations in Germany in the last years is depicted.  
The late 1990s mark a turning point for labour market reforms in Germany. Reunification did 
not only lead to enormous fiscal transfers within Germany and – after a short unification boom 
– to tendencies of stagnation; it also caused politically hard times for the trade unions under a
long period of conservative governments. Therefore, in 1995 the chairman of the Metalworkers’
union, Klaus Zwickel, launched an initiative for more macroeconomic coordination, addressed 
to chancellor Kohl (Zwickel 1999). But it was not only until 1998, when the first Red-Green 
German government led by Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, was elected, that this idea was 
picked up and a so called ‘Alliance for Jobs’ was established. Although this corporatist attempt 
to commit government, trade unions and employers’ associations to a common economic 
strategy was not very successful (Niechoj 2002), it paved the way for local alliances at 
company level. Contrary to Zwickel’s original intentions, these local alliances introduced
concession bargaining in the following years, that is, they pushed through reductions in wage 
increases, longer and more flexible working hours in exchange for – usually formal –
employment guarantees. As their main instrument, they helped establish opening clauses 
allowing individual companies to deviate from sector-wide union contracts (Massa-Wirth 
2007). Data based on the 2005 WSI Works Council Survey indicate that 75 per cent of all 
companies with a works council used an opening clause, predominately in the area of working 
time policy (Bispinck 2005). The renegotiation of industry-wide wage and employment 
standards by utilising opening clauses has rapidly spread (Berthold et al. 2003; Rehder 2003). 
This spread of concession bargaining at the company level had a significant impact on the 
creeping erosion of industry-wide employment and compensation standards: By sometimes
violating the industry-level labour contract, unions and works councils felt (and still feel)
impelled to negotiate ever more drastic concessions in exchange for a few (if any) company 
give-backs. With the monetary union, wages are now directly comparable within the EU. 
Collective wage and working time provisions are now becoming maximum rather than 
minimum standards in Germany (Schmidt 2001).  
This trend was supported and intensified by policy measures of the Red-Green government. In 
2003, the economic situation was characterised by an economic downturn after the internet 
bubble as well as high and persistent unemployment. Furthermore, these times were not only 
economically but also politically difficult ones. The Red-Green government was in a severe 
crisis that triggered Chancellor Schröder to propose and, from 2003 on, implement what was 
called the ‘Agenda 2010’, a policy framework for labour market reforms. The following
implementation laws, the Hartz laws I–IV, were named after Peter Hartz, a trade-union related 
advisor to Gerhard Schröder, who developed most of the specific tools of the laws. The concept 
itself was explicitly inspired by UK’s New Labour policy; other best practices within the EU or 
their guidelines gave no (visible) impulses to the development of theAgenda 2010 (Levy 2004). 
The laws aimed at flexibilisation of the labour market and establishment of a low-paid sector, 
which were seen as specifically German problems before the Hartz reforms (see e.g. Streeck 
and Trampusch 2005). For this purpose, temporary and fixed-term employment was fostered, 
new types of low paid part-time jobs with reduced social security entitlements were introduced
(‘midi jobs’, ‘mini jobs’), the incentives to work were intensified by reduced transfer benefits, 
tougher controls and the rule that occupational attainment gives long-term unemployed no right 
to refuse any kind of jobs offered to them by their placement officers. The duration of (income-
related) unemployment insurance benefits was reduced to one year, after that unemployment 
assistance benefits lose their character as wage replacement and are paid independently of the 
unemployed person’s last income (and contributions); these assistance benefits (Hartz IV-
benefits, or ALG II) are contingent on the recipient’s willingness to be available for the labour 
market. In certain non-profit sectors, low-paid (publicly-subsidized) work outside the regular 
labour market (the so-called ‘1-Euro jobs’) were made available. Moreover, self-employment 
for low income tasks was fostered (the ‘Ich AG’). These reforms were actually a success in 
extending wage dispersion and a-typical and low paid jobs (Bosch and Kalina 2007). Together 
with an economic upturn and reduced numbers of people looking for jobs, these policy 
measures explain the lowered unemployment rate before the financial market crisis (Horn et al. 
2008b).  
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relations system in Germany. Institutionally, a gradual erosion of the industry-wide labour 
contract has taken place. Industry-wide collective bargaining coverage has been steadily 
declining, while at the same time company-level union contracts have become more important, 
especially so in East Germany (Kohaut and Schnabel 2003; Schmidt et al. 2003). The degree of 
bargaining centralisation is further diminished because of the opening clauses in industry-wide 
union contracts, which have increased the options for local management and works councils to 
deviate from existing wage and working time standards that had previously been fixed at the 
industry level (Bosch 2004; Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv 2004). A trend towards aggregate 
income stagnation has been the result of wage moderation at the industry level, the spread of 
secondary bargaining rounds at the company level, and the establishment of a low-paid sector 
by the Hartz reforms. In most of the years since the mid-1990s, collectively agreed wages 
stayed well below the sum of inflation and productivity growth. Furthermore, effective wage 
development fell short of even these modest collectively agreed wage increases, and declined 
more and more (Schulten 2008).  
Macroeconomically, the result of this wage restraint was weak domestic demand and an 
increase in export dependence (Horn et al. 2008a). Such a strategy of low wage increases 
promoting exports might work for a small country, where the competitive advantages can 
outweigh the losses due to restricted domestic demand; in the case of Germany’s large economy 
deflationary pressure on wages spread to all EU countries, and weak EU demand was the result. 
Most of these policies were in line with the recommendations of the EU’s Integrated 
Guidelines, although several measures, such as the cuts in unemployment benefits, explicitly 
did not foster social cohesion. Contrary to the debate on fiscal deficits in the context of the 2003 
excessive deficit procedure of the Stability and Growth pact, from 2003 onwards (Niechoj 
2005a), the recommendations of the guidelines did not enter public discourse, and there was 
little information beyond the catch phrase of the EU’s becoming the most competitive economic 
area in the world. Therefore, no direct link between public opinion and support for changes in 
policies can be established. National factors – political constellations and German unification –
seem to be more important for the concrete evolution of labour market (de-)regulation in 
Germany and for the increasing fragmentation of its coordinated market economy than 
European recommendations and soft governance of the OMC. It has to be noted that although 
changes caused by internationalisation might affect other European corporatist countries in a 
similar way, the German case cannot be taken as an indication of a general tendency toward 
fragmentation among the coordinated market economies. The reasons for the erosion of 
industrial relations in Germany are due to a specific national constellation after the unification. 
Nevertheless, these developments might lead to repercussions for the European level and other 
member states.  
5. Repercussions for the European Union?   
Although Germany is still viewed as a quasi ideal-type of a coordinated market economy by 
most scholars in the field of comparative political economy, the developments of recent years 
demonstrate that the German industrial relations system is undergoing profound changes 
towards fragmentation and uncontrolled decentralisation. Germany switches from a strategy of 
high wages, compensated by high productivity, within a framework of coordinated bargaining 
(Streeck 1991) to a model of low-paid jobs with low productivity and more and more company-
based wage bargaining.  
The effects of these developments are not restricted to Germany. As Germany is the largest 
economy in the EU, all performance indicators of the EU as a whole depend a lot on Germany’s 
development. Moreover, in a common monetary union wage developments in one country have 
to be taken into account by other member states, in order to prevent losses in wage 
competitiveness. The argumentation runs as follows. The rising significance of secondary 
bargaining at the company level in Germany is seriously threatening the (national) coordination 
function that was hitherto provided by industry-wide labour contracts – local pacts increase the 
heterogeneity of wages and employment standards in the German economy. Additionally, the 
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result, unit labour costs were much lower compared to other member states of the EWU (see 
Figure 1). This fostered exports, but it also weakened private consumption (see Figure 2 and 
Figure 3) and increased and still increases pressure on other member states: In order not to lose
competitiveness all other countries have to keep their unit labour costs close to the German 
level. How and whether this is realised within the states, depends on their political 
constellations and institutions. Decentralisation and wage restraint via opening clauses or 
company-level alliances for jobs is only one possibility. It is, however, not restricted to the 
Germany case, but can be observed in the whole EU (Sisson and Artiles 2000; European 
Foundation 2008). Moreover, in most of the recently integrated Eastern European countries, 
collective agreements are not the predominant form of wage bargaining (EIRO 2005). 
Consequently, a European-wide trend towards a system of uncoordinated bargaining is a 
possible option. German wage restraint and export orientation has a share in this, nevertheless 
the presumption of a parallel development might better suit as a description of the ongoing 
changes.  
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
A second repercussion might affect the European level of governance itself. In the face of a 
shift from industry to company bargaining, the remaining torso of the sectoral collective 
bargaining system can no longer guarantee a common wage level, it cannot restrict wage 
competition among companies, and it cannot hedge against disinflation in recessions. 
Weakening the ability of the trade unions to set wages together with the employers’
associations at the industry level diminishes the balancing effect of collective agreements over 
the business cycle and among companies. Trade unions have seen this and tried to establish a 
common and cooperative wage policy in the EU (European Trade Union Confederation 1999; 
Gollbach and Schulten 2000). The trade unions’ coordination strategy, however, has serious 
shortcomings. A necessary prerequisite for such a coordinated system of collective bargaining 
and interest-mediation is the existence of encompassing associations that are able to
homogenise their members’ interests and provide for effective local implementation of
bargaining results. However, neither interest homogeneity nor reliable implementation channels 
exist for the eurozone, let alone the EU 27. Studies on the nascent European industrial relations 
system demonstrate substantial interest heterogeneity among the relevant national peak level 
trade union organisations (Marginson and Sisson 1998; Schulten 2003). Especially trade unions 
from small countries have strong incentives to free-ride by defecting from international 
coordination and moderating wage demands as they experience net employment gains in the 
current system of wage regime competition. So, even if some kind of wage coordination might 
be established at European level, the actors of this coordination might lack interest and steering 
capacity to do so.  
This again has significant impacts on monetary policy at the European Union level. If wage 
coordination is not on the agenda, and reliable forecasts for wage developments are difficult to 
establish, this will lock in the current and partly insufficient form of interplay between wage 
bargaining and the ECB for a long time (Franzese 2003). After its last policy revision in 2003, 
inflation forecasts are based largely on wage forecasts (European Central Bank 2003). Without 
some form of coordinated wage policy both nationally as well as EU-wide, employers and trade 
unions are ex ante not able to reliably signal their positions and planned wage outcomes. 
Interest rates ex post set by the ECB to match the numerous and sometimes inconsistent wage 
settlements necessarily have a tentative character and frictional losses can therefore not be 
prevented.  
But not only monetary policy, also the OMC processes have to face new challenges. All soft 
governance hinges on the commitment and cooperation of the corporative actors involved 
(Commission, national governments, employers’ associations, and trade unions) and on their 
ability to implement what was agreed on. Policy learning alone does not lead to anything 
© 2009 by Torsten Niechoj
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-010a.htm 10without proper implementation. Implementation, however, is undermined when the willingness 
to cooperate and the capacity of actors to act decreases. In Germany a part of the spectrum of 
actors, trade unions and employers’ organisations, have lost much of their capacity to act. A 
possible scenario is that the trade unions begin to ask themselves what they can gain by 
participating in European coordination procedures, when the OMC does not support corporatist 
structures within the member states. A corporatist coordination strategy depends on corporatist 
actors.  
6. Conclusion   
The Maastricht framework combines hard and soft modes of governance. As a whole, it 
modified the economic situation for firms within the EU. Not surprisingly, the improvements of 
the single market, the establishment of the eurozone and deregulation of financial markets, as 
well as the monetary policy of the independent ECB and to a lesser degree fiscal coordination 
had a deep impact on economic activity. The impact of softer forms of governance, namely the 
OMC and its IG, is harder to verify. As demonstrated for the case of Germany, national labour 
market policy was more or less in line with the EU recommendations. National political actors, 
however, did not really rely on the EU in shifting the labour market towards flexibilised labour 
contracts and decentralised bargaining. As the case of German labour market reforms suggests, 
the implementation of policies is still dependent on national developments and interest 
constellations. Hence, mostly the harder forms of supranational coordination promoted the 
fragmentation of industrial relations.  
Independently of the question whether recommendations of the EU were only congruent or 
causally linked, the results of the policy concept of competitiveness and sound macroeconomic 
policies were unsatisfactory in the case of Germany. Increased wage differentials and real wage 
losses could not guarantee high employment and growth, but instead fuelled wage 
competitiveness in Europe. A loss in control over wage negotiations aggravated monetary 
policy and simultaneously shifted responsibility to the Central Bank, which gains in 
importance. It also diminished the capacities of trade unions and employers’ organisations to 
participate in coordination processes, may it be OMC or other procedures of coordination. 
Therefore, the EU level is affected by changes in industrial relations at national level as well.  
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